I need scarcely say how honoured I feel to be asked to deliver this Lloyd Roberts lecture. It is an honour that I appreciate all the more, though with increasing misgiving, when I look at the list of my predecessors. Had I fully realized that I should find such formidable names as those of my friends Lord Cohen of Birkenhead and the Baroness Wootton, I think that prudence would have led me to decline. My only encouragement is that Lloyd Roberts was a Manchester man, and as I always hope that my sixteen years there made me a kind of honorary Mancunian, I feel that I have some small title to give the lecture that commemorates one who was clearly a remarkable Manchester character. Manchester has always been famous for producing great doctors, and it is an interesting thought that some of those who were my friends there, Fletcher Shaw, John Stopford, and the incomparable Geoffrey Jefferson, must have known Lloyd Roberts.
It encourages me, too, to speak about education that Lloyd Roberts was himself a very broadly educated man. That he should have prepared an edition of the 'Religio Medici' is not, perhaps, surprising since that was written by a remarkable doctor. But that he should have moved so far from his own field as to write about Dante is an example of a breadth of scholarship and a sense of value that is an inspiration to the educator.
There is, perhaps, a further reason why the subject of education is an appropriate one on which to address this body, for medical education as it is at present organized exemplifies, if I may be bold enough to say so, both some of the best and some of the worst educational practices. In the obituaries of Lloyd Roberts one reads of his apprenticeship first to one practitioner and then to another, and this element of apprenticeship which still dominates higher education in medicine, by which the young doctor, if he is fortunate, works with successive masters of his craft, whom he can often come to admire as people, is surely giving him one of the truest educational experiences anyone can have. On the other hand, the sheer amount of memorization, and its divorce from the actual patient, that is still characteristic of some medical education, is a feature that cannot but cause some questioning in the mind of the modern educator.
But it is not my wish to comment on medical education, were I competent to do so. I have chosen a larger theme in attempting to look at some of the problems and opportunities that face our educational system today. My nominal subject is the next ten years in education, but I am really thinking of a more distant horizon, say that of the year 2,000. For it is then that the young people we are teaching will be living and active. It is in the next millenium that many of the teachers we are now producing will still be at the height of their powers, and the kind of skill, knowledge and idealism which they will bring to the problems of that time will depend on the decisions we take now.
Aims ofEducation
Let me, then, begin with some quite general remarks about the aims of education. It is, in the first place, a process which embodies a number of different, and in some ways contradictory, functions. It is the means by which a society seeks to perpetuate certain values and to make its citizens inheritors of a great tradition. But it is also the means by which new knowledge is discovered and new interpretations put on established ideas. It has both a conservative function (and I use the adjective in the best sense) and a revolutionary one, and I use that word in the best sense too. It must clearly produce people who will serve their society whether as doctors or civil servants or plumbers, but it must also try to produceor at any rate not to stiflethe urge to question presuppositions. It must to some extent give its parent society what it wants: it must also try to discover what are the right things, and to make that society want them. We must never forget (particularly when one is over 60 and the arteries are hardening) that the two greatest teachers were both killed by their contemporaries because they encouraged this questioningand indeed one of the two specific charges against Socrates was that he was a teacher, and corrupted the young men. It is the attempt to reconcile these various functions that makes a study of the aims and methods of education a particularly useful bridge between a past embodying, in spite of its errors and its cruelties, incomparable revelations of wisdom and beauty, and a future of which our pupils will be the architects.
At no time in history has it been more important that we should concern ourselves with education, because at no time have the changes through which we are passing been more profound or more rapid. That platitude could have been, and indeed in various more literary forms has been, uttered during a number of previous epochs, and with truth. The turbulence of ideas in the medieval world can be seen both in the foundation of universities and in the disorders that often affected them. The conflicts of authorities and of classes, coupled with a great tide of new knowledge that occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, made educational change a matter of concern to some of the best minds, and produced, for example, on the one hand the Society of Jesus, and on the other the nonconformist academies. The educational writers of the nineteenth century saw themselves, rightly, as living in a time of moral and intellectual fluxand the result was two of the greatest books on education; I mean, of course, Matthew Arnold's 'Culture and Anarchy' and Newman's 'Idea of a University'. It is true that the actual practice of education often failed society, so that we see the corrupt and inefficient universities of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and we can read about them in, for example, two of the great autobiographies, those of Gibbon and Mark Pattison. The sense of rapid change was in the minds of intelligent men. Yet as we look back on those revolutionary periods and look forward to our own future we really have some juistice for regarding ours as a time more revolutioniary in ideas and demanding perhaps gieater changes in practice. The year 2,000 is merely, of course, a symbol of a ftiture which the figures make comfortably remote and yet will be a year in which, as I have said, our pupils will be at their prime, and when, and this is a still more alarming thought, teachers already well established in the schools will still be teaching. What are the factors which make it so certain that the world for which they will have to prepare their pupils is so radically different from our own, that makes us so certain that we are not simply repeating the cry, whether of hope or despair, when we say that never before has the fact of change made such revolutionary demands on the educational process? I want to consider some of those factors under three heads. The first is the amount of knowledge; the second the development of technology; and the third, changes in society itself.
The Amount ofKnowledge
It is a truism to say that in the last century and particularly in the last thirty years the sheer amount of knowledge that exists has increased with explosive force. Since the new-knowledge industry, called research, came into existence, say, fifty years ago, there has been discovered in sheer bulk more than in the whole of man's previous history. Truism though this is, it cannot be overemphasized. Let me illustrate it by a homely example: my own. I took a degree in chemistry in 1930. If I look at the papers set in chemistry today I obviously cannot do them: I would not expect to. But that is not the point: what is significant is that I never could have done them, since at least two-thirds of the questions are concerned with knowledge that simply did not exist when I was a student. And how obvious this is in the field of medicine! What would a Lloyd Roberts, or even an Osler or a Trotter have made of a state of affairs in which every pre-clinical student must understand, or at least memorize, the mysteries of the Krebs cycle? Would they have recognized their own profession when the experience, the flair, the eyes and hands of the diagnostician are supplemented, if, thank God, not yet supplanted, by an array of electronic gadgetry that raises its own moral problems by forcing us to ask how much of it should be devoted to any one patient? And if this knowledge explosion is most obvious, perhaps, in science, it is true in great degree of every subject. It is a phenomenon that obviously has profound educatiornal implications, into all of which I have no time to go. It makes it imperative, for example, that we must create a machinery of in-service training for all professions, not least for teachers, on a scale that we have never contemplated. Into the minds of some people there is creeping a conviction that we must diminish the effort we put into research, or at any rate concentrate on synthesis and reinterpretation rather than on an accumulation of facts, lest the pursuit of knowledge grind to a halt overwhelmed by the sheer bulk of irretrievable and largely insignifi-cant information. But the main conclusion is that we must inevitably become more specialized if we are to have any comprehension of what is now known in our own field.
But there is another side to this problem. If one looks at the curriculum adopted by the greatest of schoolmasters, Thomas Arnold, a hundred years ago, we find that it consisted almost entirely of the classics, with some divinity and ancient history, mitigated by a very little mathematics, taught by a master of inferior status, and an hour or two of French taught by a visiting native. And this manifestly would not do for the year 1900 let alone 2000. How, it may be asked, can one understand a world that has shrunk as ours has, without modem history or geography or economics, or perhaps, above all, natural science? And of course there is always English literature! Further, our concept of education has grown wider as our pupils come from uneducated homes. Have they no eyes that they shall never see Piero even in reproduction: no ears that they never hear the G minor quintet: no hands that they shall never actually make things in wood or clay: no bodies that they shall not have physical education? Therefore, we say, quite clearly we must discard the hopelessly specialized curriculum of Arnold and give a broad general education. We have here one of the crucial paradoxes of education in our time. On the one side we must specialize more intensively to bring some of our pupils to the frontiers of knowledge, to adopt the normal cliche. On the other we must abjure specialization so that our pupils may be fitted to understand the breadth of questions on which a citizen of a twentieth century democracy should have a view. How can the fashionable demand for 'participation' have any meaning unless it rests on hard knowledge? Yet it is the feeling that we increasingly live in a world too complex to understand and too impersonal to control that leads to some of the obvious strains in our society. The problem of what we mean by general education and how we are to give it, is one of the most intractable of our time and will become ever more acute, and will dominate some of our schools and universities for years to come. The common answer is to add subjects to the curriculum and in a way it is right. It is the answer given, for example, by my friend Professor F S Dainton as it was by Milton who wanted a curriculum including almost everything from Greek to fortification. But it will not solve the problem, for it is ultimately absurd to think, say, that making chemistry a compulsory examination requirement in the sixth form will give anyone a grasp of modern science. I wish I had time to discuss these problems of the curriculum at greater length. All I can do is to say this. I believe that more important than a body of general information is the development of a quality of mind, tough, questioning, anxious to discover the truth and knowing how to set about doing so in at any rate one field. This I believe we can only do by pursuing one or two subjects to the maximum depth the pupil can take. We can surround this core by subjects taught not in depth but with great efficiency useful to him in his work or his lifefor example Russian for the scientist. Finally, we must stimulate him to read for himself, to argue rationally and to be aware of some of the great seminal ideas over wider fields of experience even if in a more superficial way. That great American educator, Hutchins, had the idea of a programme based on the reading and discussion of a hundred great books. It is an idea that in a modified form might well be revived. But whatever our answer may be, I am convinced that experiment in the field of general education and hard discussion about what we mean by an educated man in the latter half of the twentieth century are among the most significant growth points of education over the next few decades.
The Development ofTechnology The answers which we are able to find to these questions of the content and methods of education will colour our approach to the more general subjects to which I now turn. First, what is the relevance of technological change for education? In a way it is easy to underestimate this. For there are elements in the nature of man which transcend his physical environment and these are among the most important. I have no idea at all what a Cycladic islander was like three thousand years ago, except that his material and intellectual background was totally different from my own. But he was producing works of plastic art that have exactly the same effect on me as those of a Chinaman in the seventh century or an inhabitant of Tuscany in the fifteenth or as Henry Moore has today. A Greek of the fifth century before Christ was writing about some moral problems that are recognizably the same as those, say, of Henry James, a Europeanized American of the nineteenth century. There are elements in human experience that leap across centuries and cultures and make the material environment irrelevant. But admitting these common elements of humanexperience, which it is one of the greatest tasks of education to reveal to our pupils, there are other important ways in which the real fabric of our thought is being altered by material change, in some ways for the worse. This may well be happening in the field of communication as it began happening in the sixteenth century. If printing had a significant effect on the Reformation, so did the development of the thermionic valve on politics from 1925 onwards, for it made it possible for a Hitler to address tens of thousands of people. What in the long run is going to be the effect of television not only on politics but on thought generally? We do not know. It is easy to be pessimistic about it, but on the credit side one must put its genuine power for adult education, as one of your previous lecturers, the Chancellor of my own university, Lord Clark, has recently shown in a superlative way in his series on Civilization. But one must be honest and say that a medium which encourages even some of its more serious performers to encapsulate a very difficult idea in something under two minutes of speech, and if he oversteps it to cut him off, and which subjects an air-weary politician to making a statement of policy on the tarmac, must lead to a trivialization of great matters. Further, by its very immediacy, its necessity to find some telegenic events, it lends an air of crisis to events which a previous generation would have had time to get into perspective. And by its techniques of interviewing, though some may claim them as triumphs of participatory democracy, others will feel that they are designed to create a distrust of democratic leadership, because not all statesmen can answer the loaded question with the slick smirk of the disc jockey. Here is one particular field in which the quality of life is being quite certainly changed by technological advance. Another obvious example is in the field of sexual morality. The discovery of a completely efficient contraceptive device must inevitably alter society's attitudes to sexual relationships.
There is much to be said on the credit side. The most moral of us have in the past professed a morality which we knew to be disingenuous (and to some extent we still do) because we knew that nothing could save many millions from starvation or from lives of labour little better than those of animals. I have myselfjust returned from Pakistan and, contemplating the lives of the teeming millions of the Eastern region, I was at times tempted to wonder what I really meant when I talked of the essential dignity and brotherhood of men. But we do now know that, given the will, science is at any rate increasingly giving us the means to make that profession far less of a hypocrisy than it has ever been. Our morality can no longer shelter behind the sheer technical impossibility of making happier the lives of the majority of mankind. Here, both for better and for worse, we have examples, and there are many more (I have resolutely not even mentioned the bomb), where technological change does not alter simply the amenities of life, but the whole climate of possibility in which intellectual and moral decisions can be made. It will become increasingly necessary for the problems raised by this technological revolution to be discussed in our classrooms and lecture rooms at levels appropriate to the various abilities of our pupils.
Changes in Society
We are naturally led by this all-too-superficial reference to social changes arising from technology to the much wider questions that the next thirty years will bring in the relations between education and society. Let us once more look back, to get some perspective in our discussion. Society has nearly always tried to educate a minority of socially useful people. The medieval church was unusually democratic in that it would occasionally identify and educate a boy, even from a poor home, so that he might even become a Pope. The society of the Renaissance with its emphasis on hereditary aristocracy produced a Castiglione with his curriculum for a courtier. The education of the eighteenth century designed to produce a gentleman ignored Locke and produced at its best a common culture of an educated class that was rigidly classical in content. In the early years of the nineteenth century men began for the first time to consider seriously the education of the majority of the population and, with some exceptions, even then in the bare essentials of literacy. The movements of the nineteenth century towards a universal literacy and sometimes to something more, inspired by working class movements, by the Church, by the economic need for an educated working class, and most important of all by the growth of democratic ideas, led to educational change on a wider scale than ever before in history. The Act of 1870, though it did not itself make elementary education free and compulsory, made this inevitable in a few years. The Act of 1902, moulded by the greatest and too little known of civil servants, Morant, made secondary education of a kind that seemed to him, a Wykehamist, the highest form of secondary education, accessible to an elite of the able. And finally the Act of 1944 opened the doors of secondary education to all. What changes in attitudes towards a democratic society, what modifications in technique, what a revolution in the function of the state have I summarized in those three dates! And now we have opened the way to some kind of tertiary education, whether in university or polytechnic, whether in college of education or adult class, by removing at any rate the most obvious financial barriers. Let me say something about the new world we are entering, in which higher education of some kind is regarded as a right and not a privilege. The expansion of higher education beyond the school stage will, without doubt, be one of the dominant features of the next few decades. It raises a variety of very difficult questions to which answers will have to be found. One, for example, is the kind of institutions appropriate to the increasing number of young people in this tier of education. At present we have established a binary system with autonomous universities on the one hand and on the other colleges of education, of art and a growing number of polytechnics already doing work of degree standard. What we have not decided is what proportion of the population involved should go to one kind of institution rather than another, and why, and this is clearly bound up with very difficult questions as to whether existing universities should expand, some of them very greatly, or whether new ones should be created. That some such expansion should occur I am convinced. That the number of those going to a university, as I would interpret the term, should increase proportionately with the number of those possessing the required paper qualification is something about which I am more doubtful. A university course, with its rigour, its emphasis on independent work, its assumption of a positive love of learning, demands a strength of motive that not all of those technically qualified may possess, and they may well be happier in institutions whose work is more obviously related to the immediate and the concrete.
The very massive developments in the sheer quantity of education over the past century have arisen not simply from economic needs but also from political sentiments. They are natural results of the growth during the nineteenth century of a whole complex of ideas associated with the word 'democracy'. There are two particular aspects of that word, the educational implications of which I want to remind you. The first is that a democratic philosophy involves a belief in liberty and this belief in turn has two different meanings for education. In the first place it has led to changing attitudes in the schools and elsewhere, attitudes which are very loosely associated with the word libertarianism. In the sense that these attitudes have made schools much happier places than they once were, and replaced rigid discipline by attitudes of mutual respect between teacher and pupil, I myself welcome them, believe that they lead actually to greater efficiency and trust that they will continue in spite of what may be written in a Black Paper. In the sense that a misinterpretation of them leads to a distrust of all authority as such, even the authority that comes from manifestly greater knowledge and experience, I believe that they may be harmful. There can be no doubt that the next decades will involve a constant dialogue as to the proper methods of government of schools and colleges, and the proper means by which decisions should be made. What the educator must strive to ensure is that these discussions rest on knowledge and on reason. This dialogue is further complicated by the fact that the growth of democratic sentiment and the magnitude of the whole educational system makes it inevitable that the state should play an everincreasing part in every kind of education. This is a process that rouses in some profound alarm, particularly in the universities. I myself view this movement with less apprehension than many of my friends. As I see it, one of the main tasks, if the educational system of thirty years hence is to meet its obligations adequately, is to decide exactly what are the areas in which the freedom of academic institutions and individuals is most vital. If they become simply places in which the material and manpower needs of society are met as cheaply as possible then we shall have lost something of priceless value. For in a world where religion has lost its universal authority, places of education, and particularly of higher education, have become the chief custodians and interpreters of value in society, and such a function can only be pursued in an atmosphere of responsible freedom. The responsibility of such places is not only to the state: it is also to a tradition of culture and to the pursuit of truth.
One other very powerful element in the word democracy as we normally use it is the idea of equality. I have, I fear, no time to pursue the very profound implications of this word for education as I would wish. Some of them conflict with the no less democratic belief in liberty. To take an obvious example, one controversy that will be with us for many years is whether it is right that some people should be free to buy an education for their children different from, and in some ways perhaps better than, that provided freely by the state. It is obvious that here the two central ideas of democracy are in conflict. My other fear is lest a humane and in some fields justifiable belief in equality may lead us to undervalue excellence, and lest we create an institutional framework which makes it more rather than less difficult for great natural talents to flourish. It is, indeed, for us the central problem of education in the next twenty or thirty years to attempt to reconcile the demands of an increasingly democratic society for both freedom and equality, and especially to reconcile its equalitarian tendencies with a recognition and fostering of excellence. Thus in my own field of higher education one of the greatest of American educators and scientists, Lee du Bridge, has said: 'It is important to the national interest to have many good universities, and it is desirable for every college and university to get a little better. But it is equally important that there be a few institutions of really superb quality. We must for the sake of future generations have a few outstanding leaders, a few institutions that are blazing the trail of the future.' This I believe to be profoundly true. The crucial problem on which the quality of our life will in fact depend is to win acceptance for such heterogeneity, such a recognition of a hierarchy, with the administrative arrangements that go with it, in a society that is nominally committed to egalitarianism.
The reconciliation if it is achieved will lie in giving a greater reality to the conception of equality of opportunity, rather than in attempting to behave as though individual differences of endowment did not exist. And that phrase brings me to my last line of thought. We are coming to realize more and more clearly the fact that we expect too much from education, in the sense that however equal we make educational opportunity, however much we improve our schools, their influence is far from predominant when compared with that of the home and of the subculture in which the child lives. We cannot really talk about equality of opportunity between the child from the good home, with books and music and rational conversation, and that from the overcrowded tenement with feckless or indifferent or incompetent parents, however well-meaning, whose very vocabulary is limited. We can and do and must struggle to redress the balance by widening the activities of our schools. We surprisingly often have our successes with the child of exceptional endowments. But in some ways our task is becoming more difficult by the dis-educative effects of the life and culture of our great cities. We delude ourselves if we believe that education by itself can bring about further immense social progress. It must be seen as but one part of a great movement to enrich the lives of communities. It may be heretical for a teacher to say so, but today I feel that an education act, whatever is in it, will actually do less for education and for the moral and intellectual as well as the physical well-being of our children than, for example, the implementation of the Seebohm Report. We require more fundamental measures than tinkering with school organization, a process that may actually be harmful, if the year 2000 is to see ours a more just society. This is not simply an abdication of responsibility by the teacher: it is a statement of what everv teacher knows; that for education to be effective it must be supported by the family and the community and must regard itself as only one of the agencies which seek to support those institutions.
Faced with such problems, we may be forgiven if we despair, as one of the greatest of modem poets, T S Eliot, despaired when he wrote: ' We can assert with some confidence that our own period is one of decline; that the standards of culture are lower than they were fifty years ago; and that the evidences of this decline are visible in every department of human activity . . . And we know that whether education can foster and improve culture, it can surely adulterate and degrade it. For there is no doubt that in our headlong rush to educate everybody we are lowering our standards, and more and more abandoning the study of those subjects by which the essentials of our culture are transmitted, destroying our ancient edifices to make ready the ground upon which the barbarian nomads of the future will encamp in their mechanised caravans.' And Eliot may, of course, be right. The kind of society which mass education and scientific technology together create, even if it does not destroy itself physically, may be one in which human values have declined: in which a candyfloss culture, dominated by the standards of an uncritical majority manipulated by the ad-man, has become dominant. In other words education may lose, and if it does it will be towards some kind of Philistine totalitarianism that we shall move.
But though most of us have felt at times as Eliot felt, no teacher can remain a pessimist or he would give up his job. We have got to believe that we can reconcile the idea of a more humane, more just, more materially affluent society with a belief in standards of excellence. What we must never do is to lose our nerve, and believe that matters of judgment in questions of value, whether in oesthetics or morals or truth, can be settled by majority votes. The teacher, of all men, must regard his task as a continuous battle to perceive by self-education the right values more clearly, to proclaim them, and to defend them by rational means even if he seems to have lost. Let me end by quoting one of my favourite passages written over a century ago by the greatest analyst of the most powerful democracy the world has known: 'I am full of apprehension and of hopes. I perceive mighty dangers which it is possible to ward off, mighty evils which may be avoided or alleviated; and I cling with a firmer hold to the belief that for the democratic nations to be virtuous and prosperous they require but to will it ... The nations of our time cannot prevent the conditions of man from becoming equal; but it depends upon ourselves whether the principle of equality is to lead them to servitude or freedom, to knowledge or barbarism, to prosperity or wretchedness.' It is in the spirit of that passage from Tocqueville that I, as a teacher, want us to contemplate the past, to judge the present and to approach the future, daunting though it may sometimes seem. It is a sentiment that must appeal to this Society, dedicated as it is both to the advancement of knowledge and to the well-being of mankind.
